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MEMORANDUM

To: Governor Stassen
Thru: Mr. Matteson
From: Edmund A. Gullion

Subject: Re Conversations with Usachev and Zamyatin, at USSR Mission
to UN, July 3 and July 12 and 16, respectively. (Re "Overflights")

1. Usachev on July 3, 1956 told me he wished to "resume our friendship"(!) I accordingly invited him to luncheon with Mr. Pratt, USUN, who was present during part of our talks, but not for (b) infra.

(a) Usachev refused to agree with my suggestion that there had been some progress in disarmament or towards understanding by the USA and USSR of each other's motives. I had specifically cited the Bulganin proposal for ground inspectors and our acceptance of it; the Soviet listing for the first time at London of the "objects of control," i.e. things to be inspected; the talks between Mr. Stassen and Bulganin, Khrushchev and Gromyko; and the underlying, implicit but important understanding achieved at Geneva that full-scale nuclear war was less probable and the President's service in convincing USSR that USA did not intend to attack it. Usachev scoffed at any achievement in the disarmament field. He said my points were of trifling importance and cancelled out by the actions of the West in constantly deserting its own proposals in the face of each Soviet initiative. He agreed categorically and even enthusiastically that the bilateral conversations with Mr. Stassen in London were gains, not so much intrinsically, but as a start.

(b) Most significantly, with respect to perspectives post-Geneva, he said, with an air of heavy innuendo, that the Soviet Union was "no longer so confident that the US had no intention of attacking". "Certain actions" made them think we might have that intention. (I am quite confident from the way this was brought into the conversation shortly following reference to the President's Geneva plan that what Usachev was hinting at was the alleged US overflights of the Soviet Union which had not yet been made public and about which Gromyko was to speak on July 12, 1956.)

(c) The rest of the conversation was routine, with Usachev claiming that the US economy was sick, that we did not know where to put our capital except in luxury goods, since the monopolies would not let us go into real production; boasts that the Soviet Gross National Product was increasing more rapidly than ours; charges of colonialism

*We have this memo.
from [redacted], CIA's
July 1 [redacted]
member on [redacted]
staff. I have given a
copy to Amery.*

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against the US and our allies and denial that the Soviet was colonialist. Usachev's tone was arrogant compared to his manner in London this Spring and in London the preceding year.

(d) Usachev said he would be in Washington very soon and hoped to see me.

Zamyatin

As contrasted to Usachev, Zamyatin was less friendly and even truculent, although he usually maintained a forced jocularity.

At a French Delegation reception held on an open terrace on July 12, 1956, a jet plane flew over at a great height leaving contrails. I was standing with Zamyatin and a Yugoslav representative. The latter challenged us to identify the plane. Zamyatin said with no smile at all, "I refuse even to look up at that plane. We are tired of seeing those things fly over our country." On another occasion, just after the 10-1-1 vote in the Disarmament Commission, I said I would look forward to seeing him in Washington if he came down again. He said, "For a drink, yes; for cooperation, no. You will regret this pressure upon our Delegation."

Comment

(The remarks of Zamyatin and Usachev, and the latter particularly, are significant in conjunction with Gromyko's speech of July 12 in which he used the alleged US overflights in an attempt to discredit the "Open Sky" plan, and in the light of the proceedings of the recent Supreme Soviet in which the same link was made (Moscow telegram 117, July 16). One speaker at the Supreme Soviet alleged that the "overflights" and the Poznan uprising were both indications of "Western circles determination to prevent improvement of international relations."

Ambassador Lodge anticipated Gromyko's charge on "overflights" in view of the latter's uncalled-for characterization on July 3 of the Eisenhower Plan as "notorious" and his heavy intimations that "further discussion of it would do no good for the cause or to anyone".

It is most unusual, if not unprecedented, for the USSR to introduce into the UN a controversy with the US on which it has recently presented a protest and in advance of any reply.

Gromyko's attitude and his speeches from the outset of the meeting were in striking contrast to his calm dispassionate conduct during the six weeks of the London meetings. It is also probable that the reversion to the cold war, pre-Geneva tone was accelerated by the Poznan incident. The other US advisors to the Delegation share my view that the Soviet Delegation was apparently sincerely exercised by the alleged overflights.)

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